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GhanaSmallholder farmers in developing countries often suffer from high risk and limited market access.
Contract farming may improve the situation under certain conditions. Several studies analyzed effects
of contracts on smallholder productivity and income with mixed results. Most existing studies focused
on one particular contract scheme. Contract characteristics rarely differ within one scheme, so little is
known about how different contract characteristics may influence the benefits for smallholders. Here,
we address this research gap using data from oil palm farmers in Ghana who participate in different con-
tract schemes. Some of the farmers have simple marketing contracts, while others have resource-
providing contracts where the buyer also offers inputs and technical services on credit. A comparison
group cultivates oil palm without any contract. Regression models that control for selection bias show
that resource-providing contracts increase farmers’ input use and yield. Resource-providing contracts
also incentivize higher levels of specialization and an increase in the scale of production. These effects
are especially pronounced for small and medium-sized farms. In contrast, the marketing contracts have
no significant effects on input use, productivity, and scale of production. The results suggest that
resource-providing contracts alleviate market access constraints, while simple marketing contracts do
not in this context.
 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articleunder the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Participation of smallholder farmers in modern supply chains is
an important element of rural economic development and poverty
reduction. However, market access for smallholders is often lim-
ited due to weak infrastructure, high risk, and other types of mar-
ket failures (Barrett et al., 2012; Miyata, Minot, & Hu, 2009).
Market failures lead to under-investment in farm inputs, technolo-
gies, and profitable high-value crops (Otsuka, Nakano, & Takahashi,
2016; Wang, Wang, & Delgado, 2014). Small farms are often more
affected by market failures than large farms, which can perpetuate
and further aggravate existing inequalities (Minot & Sawyer, 2016;
Ton, Vellema, Desiere, Weituschat, & D’Haese, 2018). Contract
farming is an institutional response to market failures, as contracts
can help reduce production and marketing risk and thus increasesmallholder investment, productivity, and income (Eaton &
Shepherd, 2001; Key & Runsten, 1999; Simmons, Winters, &
Patrick, 2005; Wang, Moustier, & Loc, 2014).
Various studies analyzed effects of contracts on farm produc-
tion and household welfare (e.g., Key & Runsten, 1999; Mishra,
Kumar, Joshi, & D’Souza, 2018; Rao, Brümmer, & Qaim, 2012;
Simmons et al., 2005; Tripathi, Singh, & Singh, 2005). Recent
review articles revealed that the results are mixed, which may be
due to differences in terms of the commodities produced or the
broader socioeconomic and institutional conditions (Bellemare &
Bloem, 2018; Ton et al., 2018). Differences in contract characteris-
tics may also play a role (Ochieng, Veettil, & Qaim, 2017). One
major difference in contract characteristics exists between simple
marketing contracts that only offer a secure sales market, and
resource-providing contracts that additionally provide credit,
inputs, and other technical services (Mighell & Jones, 1963). Mar-
keting contracts and resource-providing contracts can have differ-
ential effects on farmers’ market access, risk, investment, and
production behavior, but a comparison of effects has rarely been
performed. Most existing studies only observed one type of con-
tract in one setting. Comparison between such case studies from
2 A. Ruml, M. Qaim /World Development 136 (2020) 105110different settings is difficult because of many possible confounding
factors that one cannot easily control for.
A few studies examined contracts involving several commodi-
ties (Miyata et al., 2009; Narayanan, 2014; Simmons et al., 2005)
or several companies (Ragasa, Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018), yet
mostly without explicitly analyzing the effects of varying contract
characteristics. Two exceptions are Mishra, Kumar, Joshi, and
D’Souza (2016) and Ashraf, Giné, and Karlan (2009). Mishra et al.
(2016) investigated effects of contracts on smallholder seed pro-
ducers in Nepal, suggesting that resource-providing contracts
may have larger effects than simple marketing contracts. However,
in their study the number of farmers operating under the different
contract types was relatively small. Ashraf et al. (2009) used a ran-
domized controlled trial (RCT) to compare effects of contracts with
and without credit in the Kenyan horticultural sector. They found
that the provision of credit as part of the contract increased farm-
ers’ participation rates but had no additional effect on income.
Effects on farmers’ cropping patterns and longer-term investment
decisions were not analyzed, because the evaluation was con-
ducted shortly after the RCT treatments.
We add to this research direction by evaluating and comparing
the effects of marketing contracts and resource-providing con-
tracts on farmers’ input use, productivity, and longer-term crop-
ping decisions in the palm oil sector of Ghana. In Ghana, as in
several other countries of West Africa, oil palm recently gained
in importance and is now one of the most important cash crops
produced (Rhebergen et al., 2016). However, limited adoption of
modern technologies and low productivity remain important chal-
lenges for the sector. Productivity increases are required to meet
the rapidly rising demand for vegetable oil in West Africa. In com-
parison to other local crops, oil palm is relatively capital-intensive,
especially for plantation establishment but also to pay for regular
inputs. To overcome market limitations, increase production, and
ensure stable supply, palm oil processing companies in Ghana have
established various types of contractual arrangements with
farmers.
We use survey data collected in Ghana in 2018 and different
statistical approaches to reduce potential issues of selection bias.
The main research question is whether producing oil palm under
a contract has effects on farmers’ cropping patterns, investments,
and yields and whether the effects of resource-providing contracts
differ from those of simple marketing contracts. We analyze aver-
age effects and additionally disaggregate by farm size to better
understand distributional implications.2. Background and hypotheses
2.1. Potential effects of marketing and resource-providing contracts
Contract farming involves a contractual arrangement between a
buyer – typically a processing company – and the farmer as a
seller. Contracts specify prices and quantities of the commodity
produced prior to the harvest, and possibly other details related
to the production process. Contracts can be beneficial for both
the farmer and the company, as they reduce marketing and pro-
curement risks (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; Key & Runsten, 1999;
Otsuka et al., 2016). However, different types of contracts can have
different effects.
One major difference in terms of contract characteristics exists
between simple marketing contracts and resource-providing con-
tracts. Farmers with a simple marketing contract have a secure
sales market with a specified price. High risk in the small farm sec-
tor is a major impediment for technology adoption and more
intensified production. Price uncertainty and hold-up issues can
further act as an entry barrier for smallholder farmers (Herath &Weersink, 2009). Hence, a contract that reduces marketing risk
may increase technology adoption, input use, and thus also yield
and income (Anbarassan, Chandrasekaran, Raman, & Karthick,
2016; Bellemare, 2012). Several empirical studies confirmed posi-
tive effects of marketing contracts on farm productivity and
income (Andersson, Chege, Rao, & Qaim, 2015; Henningsen,
Mpeta, Adem, Kuzilwa, & Czekaj, 2015; Michelson, 2013; Rao
et al., 2012). However, there are also other studies that found no
significant effects of marketing contracts, suggesting that a secure
sales market alone may be insufficient to overcome failures in
credit and input markets (Hernández, Reardon, & Berdegué,
2007; Mwambi, Oduol, Mshenga, & Saidi, 2016). Such failures in
credit and input markets are explicitly addressed through
resource-providing contracts, where the buying company also sup-
plies inputs and technical advice to farmers, usually deducting the
cost of these services from farmers’ sales. Indeed, many empirical
studies found that resource-providing contracts increase farmers’
input use, yield, and specialization on the contracted crop
(Bolwig, Gibbon, & Jones, 2009; Champika & Abeywickrama,
2014; Maertens & Velde, 2017; Miyata et al., 2009; Ragasa et al.,
2018; Warning & Key, 2002). However, depending on the situation,
resource-providing contracts can also be associated with problems
of side-selling (Otsuka et al., 2016).
Marketing contracts and resource-providing contracts can have
different effects, especially in situations where technological
upgrading requires larger investments and where access to credit
and input markets is limited. Indeed, the available literature sug-
gests that the effects of marketing contracts are more diverse
and smaller in magnitude than the effects of resource-providing
contracts (Otsuka et al., 2016). Findings about positive effects of
marketing contracts are often related to the vegetable sector
(Andersson et al., 2015; Ashraf et al., 2009; Michelson, 2013; Rao
et al., 2012), where investment requirements are low or moderate.
In plantation crops – such as tea, cocoa, or oil palm – where the ini-
tial establishment costs are higher, simple marketing contracts
may have smaller effects than resource-providing contracts,
although a comparison under otherwise similar conditions has
not been made before.
2.2. Oil palm farming and contracts in Ghana
Oil palm is native to West Africa and has been traditionally
grown by local farmers on a small scale. These farmers typically
harvest in small amounts, due to a lack of large buyers, and sell
oil palm fruits to small mills and local consumers, or manually pro-
cess palm oil (Byerlee, Falcon, & Naylor, 2017). With the increasing
demand for vegetable oil during the last 20 years, the Ghanaian oil
palm sector gradually commercialized and the area dedicated to oil
palm substantially increased (Rhebergen et al., 2016). However,
despite the agroecological suitability for oil palm cultivation and
the large areas currently cultivated, productivity levels remain
low and far behind South East Asian suppliers. Low adoption rates
of modern technologies and the fragmentation of the market, with
little coordination among supply chain actors, are the main obsta-
cles for productivity growth (Rhebergen, Fairhurst, Whitbread,
Giller, & Zingore, 2018). In the future, the Ghanaian oil palm sector
will continue to grow in order to meet the rising demand. A partic-
ular focus should be on increasing crop yields, as further expanding
the oil palm area is often associated with a loss in tropical rain-
forests and related negative externalities for climate and biodiver-
sity protection (Qaim, Sibhatu, Siregar, & Grass, 2020).
Contract farming has the potential to stimulate yield and pro-
ductivity growth in the oil palm sector, as it coordinates transac-
tions along supply chain actors and provides a secure sales
market for farmers. Reduced market risk through contracts could
increase farmers’ investments in inputs and technologies. How-
Table 1





Company name Benso Oil Palm
Plantation (BOPP)
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(TOPP)
Company owner Wilmar International
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Unilever
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Size of nucleus
estate
4700 ha 4300 ha
Processing
capacity
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sufficient for farmers to overcome potential capital constraints.
Access to formal credit is difficult in Ghana, as most farmers do
not have formal land titles that they could use as collateral.
Resource-providing contracts could possibly be more suitable in
this context, as they involve credit and technology options for
farmers without requiring formal land titles as collateral.
Currently, five large palm oil processing companies are located
in the study area in southern Ghana. These companies cultivate
own plantations and additionally purchase oil palm bunches from
smallholder farmers through contract schemes. Out of the five
companies, we selected two based on differences in their contract
characteristics and geographical proximity – both key criteria for
meaningful evaluation and comparison of contract effects. Table 1
provides an overview of the two selected companies and their con-
tract characteristics. Benso Oil Palm Plantation (BOPP) is a sub-
sidiary of Wilmar International Limited, whereas Twifo Oil Palm
Plantation (TOPP) is owned by Unilever. Both companies operate
a centrally managed, nucleus estate oil palm plantation. However,
as the processing capacities are larger than what the nucleus estate
plantations produce, both companies also contract smallholder oil
palm producers.2 BOPP is using simple marketing contracts,
whereas TOPP is using resource-providing contracts.
The BOPP marketing contracts are agreements between the
company and farmers, in which an annual fixed price and regular
pick-ups of the harvested produce are specified. Farmers harvest
and sell from their own-established oil palm plots without receiv-
ing inputs or production-related services from the company. Even
though the contracts are verbal in nature, farmers clearly perceive
BOPP as a secure market, as they can always sell the quantities har-
vested to the company at the specified price. The company
depends on farmers’ regular sales to be able to operate at full pro-
cessing capacity.
The TOPP resource-providing contracts are long-term written
agreements between the company and farmers. These contracts
involve the establishment of new oil palm plots on the farmers’
land. Farmers dedicate a particular piece of their land to the con-
tract and are assisted by the company in the setup of the oil palm
plantation. The assistance includes the planting material, tools,
machinery, and agrochemical inputs provided on credit. The aver-
age costs for the plantation setup and the first few years of main-
tenance until the palms are starting to bear fruits are estimated at
around 1600 US dollars per hectare. However, the credit is not a
fixed amount of money, as farmers decide themselves which
inputs to use and how much. Farmers are charged an annual inter-
est rate of 11.5% on the individual credit amount taken. Credit
repayment and interest rate payments occur through the company
paying contracted farmers only for three-quarters of the fruit
bunches harvested until the credit is fully redeemed (i.e., one-
quarter of the harvest is kept by the company without compensa-
tion). In addition to the plantation setup, farmers can also obtain
labor services, tools, and regular inputs – such as fertilizer and pes-
ticides – on credit from the company throughout the entire con-
tract duration. These additional credits are also deducted from
the farmers’ subsequent sales. It is important to mention that
farmers themselves are the ones making decisions about input
use on their plots, that is, the company only sells inputs on credit
as specifically ordered by each farmer. Farmers are obligated to sell
all the fruit bunches harvested on the contracted plot to TOPP.
Side-selling is forbidden and punished, but seems to be a rare phe-
nomenon in this context because different processing companies
do not procure in the same villages.2 Such combinations of nucleus estate and smallholder contract schemes are also
observed in Southeast Asia’s palm oil sector (Gatto, Wollni, Asnawi, & Qaim, 2017;
Qaim et al., 2020).Both companies have been active in the region with the same
types of contracts for more than 10 years. Most farmers in the mar-
keting contract scheme joined in the late-1990s and early-2000s.
The resource-providing contract scheme started with plot setups
between 2007 and 2008. Hence, we are able to analyze possible
short-term and longer-term effects on farmers’ investment deci-
sions and productivity outcomes. The companies buy fresh oil
palm fruit bunches from farmers without any quality
differentiation.
2.3. Research hypotheses
We hypothesize that marketing contracts have smaller effects
on input use and yield than resource-providing contracts, as oil
palm is a capital-intensive crop and credit and input market fail-
ures are commonplace outside of contractual arrangements. We
also hypothesize that resource-providing contracts may incen-
tivize farmers to specialize more on oil palm at the expense of
other cash crops for which no contracts are available. In the study
region in Ghana, land is often not the most limiting factor. Farmers
typically have more land available than what they can cultivate
given their capital and labor constraints. Hence, some of the farm-
ers’ land remains uncultivated. Against this background, resource-
providing contracts, which help to ease farmers’ capital con-
straints, may lead to more land being cultivated and a larger scale
of production. The same effects are not expected for simple mar-
keting contracts.
These hypotheses are tested empirically below. In addition to
looking at average effects of marketing and resource-providing
contracts, we will also carry out the analysis for different subsam-
ples, distinguishing between small-, medium-, and large-scale
farmers. Small farms usually suffer most from market access con-
straints, so we hypothesize that they may also benefit more from
resource-providing contracts than large farms.
3. Sampling design
The two companies with different types of contracts operate in
different but neighboring regions of Ghana, namely the Western
and Central Regions (Fig. 1). To keep transaction costs low, both
companies cluster their procurement in certain villages. Within
these villages, the companies accept all farmers willing to supply
oil palm bunches on a regular basis into the contract scheme; that
is, the companies do not use specific selection criteria. Farmers in
these villages can choose between participating or not participat-
ing in the contract offered, but – as only one type of contract is
offered in each village and region – they have no choice between
Table 2
Regional characteristics.
Western Region (Marketing contract) Central Region (Resource-providing contract) Ashanti Region (Comparison)
Area classification Tropical savanna climate Tropical savanna climate Tropical savanna climate
Highest temperature (monthly average) 28.86 C 28.66 C 28.63 C
Lowest temperature (monthly average) 25.09 C 25.30 C 25.22 C
Mean temperature 27.16 C 27.19 C 26.97 C
Average annual rainfall 1268.03 mm 1248.53 mm 1245.79 mm
Gross income per capita (GNI) 3782 GHS 3634 GHS 3598 GHS
Human development index (HDI) 0.609 0.541 0.603
Employment to population ratio 66.3 66.1 64.8
Rural unemployment rates 3.8% 4.1% 4.6%
Notes: Temperature and rainfall data are derived from the World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal and refer to monthly averages between 1991 and 2015. Mean
temperature and average annual rainfall are calculated based on monthly averages. GNI and HDI are derived from the Global Data Lab 2017. Employment rates are derived
from the Ghana Statistical Service, 2013.
Fig. 1. Map of study area in Ghana Source: Authors’ own presentation using tools provided in Kahle and Wickham (2013).
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farmers in the procurement villages in both regions, as explained
in more detail below.
In addition to the contracted farmers, we need a group of com-
parison farmers producing oil palm without any contract. Within
the procurement villages in the Western and Central Regions only
few noncontracted farmers produce oil palm, because the majority
of oil palm producers self-selected into contract farming. The few
remaining households have a few oil palms that they primarily
grow and harvest for home consumption. Even if these non-
contracted farmers are more commercially oriented, they made a
deliberate decision not to participate in a contract scheme, which
could easily lead to non-random selection problems in our impact
evaluation. Similarly, sampling comparison farmers from other vil-
lages in the same regions could also lead to selection problems,
because the companies did not select procurement villages on a
random basis. Against this background, we decided to sample the
group of comparison farmers from a third region, namely the3 Moving to another region in order to get access to a different contract type is not a
realistic option for farmers, as they could not easily get land for cultivation in other
communities. For the companies it matters where the farmers have their land, as the
companies pick up the harvest from the plantations of contracted farmers.Ashanti Region. In the north of this region, currently one contract
farming scheme exists (Fig. 1). In the south of the Ashanti Region,
farmers produce oil palm commercially without a contract,
because they are outside of the catchment areas’ of the current
schemes. Thus, they sell their harvested oil palm fruits or manually
processed palm oil on the spot market. While the fresh fruits are
perishable, the processed palm oil has a longer shelf-life, which
is an advantage when the output market is insecure.
Comparing farmers with different types of contracts and with-
out contracts in three different regions raises concerns, because
contract differences are perfectly correlated with possible regional
differences. We considered this problem in our sampling frame-
work and chose three regions that are very similar in terms of their
agroecological and socioeconomic conditions (Table 2). All three
regions are located within the green belt that is particularly suit-
able for the cultivation of oil palm (Rhebergen et al., 2016). Also,
we knew from the local Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA)
that an additional company was planning to build a new oil palm
processing facility and procure from a number of villages in the
south of the Ashanti Region through marketing contracts. Farmers
were not aware of these plans when we carried out the survey. But
the information about the upcoming contract scheme helped us to
select comparison villages and farmers that are similar to those in
the two contract groups.
A. Ruml, M. Qaim /World Development 136 (2020) 105110 5To select farmers for the survey within each of the regions, we
used a two-stage sampling procedure. The first stage was the ran-
dom selection of procurement or future procurement villages using
village lists that we obtained from the two companies in the Cen-
tral and Western Regions and from MoFA in the Ashanti Region.
We cross-checked the completeness of these village lists together
with local agricultural extension officers on the ground. We ran-
domly selected nine villages each in the Central and Ashanti
Regions. In the Western region, we randomly sampled 13 villages,
because the average number of farmers per village participating in
the resource-providing contract was lower than in the marketing
contract. In the second sampling stage, we randomly selected oil
palm farmers in each of the 31 selected villages. In the Central
and Western Regions, we randomly selected 75% of all contracted
farmers. In the Ashanti Region, oil palm farmers were selected ran-
domly based on complete lists that we prepared together with the
village chiefs.
The total sample includes 463 households. A breakdown by
contract scheme and farm size is shown in Table 3. These house-
holds were interviewed, using a carefully prepared and pre-
tested questionnaire programmed into tablet computers. The
interviews captured structured data at the household level (gen-
eral socioeconomic variables), the oil palm plot level (inputs, out-
puts, plot characteristics), and the farmer level (age, education,
etc.). Some of the farms have more than one oil palm plot. We cap-
tured data for all oil palm plots owned and managed by the farm-
ers, so that the number of plot observations is somewhat larger
than the number of household observations (Table 3).4 In addition
to the household interviews, we had prepared a village-level ques-
tionnaire that was administered with the village chiefs to capture
additional information on village infrastructure, population, and
other relevant village-level variables.4. Statistical approaches
4.1. Outcome variables
We want to analyze and compare the effects of marketing con-
tracts and resource-providing contracts on farmers’ short-term and
longer-term production decisions. Short term production decisions
are especially decisions related to input use, which is best captured
at the plot level. The two most important external inputs in oil
palm production are chemical fertilizer and herbicides. Neverthe-
less, many farmers in Ghana do not use these inputs on a regular
basis. Therefore, rather than looking at input quantities, we mea-
sure whether or not farmers used any chemical fertilizer and her-
bicides on their oil palm plot during the 12 months prior to the
survey with two separate dummy variables. In addition to the
inputs used, we are interested in the effects of the contracts on
crop productivity, which we measure in terms of oil palm yields
per acre (fresh fruit bunches harvested during the 12 months prior
to the survey).
Longer-term production decisions are related to the scale of
production and the degree of specialization. Effects on such
longer-term outcomes can be evaluated with our data, because
the farmers in our sample had entered the contract schemes
already more than 10 years ago. As mentioned, farmers in the
study regions often have more land available than they actually
cultivate, the difference mostly occurring due to capital and labor
constraints. The oil palm contracts may reduce the capital and
labor constraints, so the scale of production may possibly increase.
We measure the scale of production as the land area that a farmer4 For farmers in the resource-providing contract, only oil palm plots registered
under this scheme were included.cultivates with commercial crops (those not primarily grown for
home consumption) relative to the total land available to the
household. Hence this variable ranges between zero and one. Crops
cultivated primarily for home consumption are excluded from this
calculation, because these are usually less affected by capital con-
straints, meaning that effects of oil palm contracts can hardly be
expected.
Oil palm contracts reduce risk and could therefore also increase
the farmers’ level of specialization. We measure specialization as
the proportion of the commercial crop area that a household culti-
vates with oil palm. This variable ranges between zero and one. As
a second indicator, we count the number of cash crops other than
oil palm that the household produces. This indicator of cash crop
diversity can take non-negative integer numbers and is negatively
related to oil palm specialization. Hence, we would expect a posi-
tive effect of contracts on specialization and a negative effect on
cash crop diversity.
4.2. Regression models
The effects of marketing and resource-providing contracts on
input use and yields in oil palm production are estimated at the
plot level with models of the following type:
Yihj ¼ b0 þ b1MCi þ b2RPCi þ b3Ci þ b4Ch þ b5Cj þ eihj ð1Þ
where Yihj is the outcome variable of interest on plot i of household
h in village j. We estimate separate regressions for fertilizer use,
herbicide use, and yield. MC and RPC are dummy variables for the
marketing contract and the resource-providing contract. These are
our main explanatory variables of interest. Positive coefficients for
b1 and b2 would indicate that the contracts increase input use and
yield. Our hypothesis that resource-providing contracts have larger
effects than simple marketing contracts would imply b2 > b1.
Ci, Ch, and Cj in equation (1) are plot-level, household-level, and
village-level control variables, and eihj is a random error term clus-
tered at the village level. At the plot level, we control for factors
such as soil quality, plantation age, and irrigation, which may have
independent effects on the outcome variables. At the household
level, we control for socioeconomic characteristics of the farmer
responsible for cultivating the plot, including sex, education, and
experience in oil palm farming. We also use a dummy for whether
or not the household is also involved in cocoa production. Cocoa is
generally produced with higher input intensities than oil palm in
Ghana, which may possibly lead to spillover effects across crops
within the same household. At the village level, we control for dis-
tance to input suppliers.
The effects of the contracts on the scale of production, special-
ization, and cash crop diversity are estimated at the household
level with models of the following type:
Shj ¼ c0 þ c1MCh þ c2RPCh þ c3Xh þ c4Xj þ uhj ð2Þ
where Shj is the outcome variable of interest for household h in vil-
lage j. Xh and Xj are household-level and village-level controls,
which are similar to those in equation (1) with only a few differ-
ences. For instance, we use socioeconomic characteristics of the
household head, which may be the farmer cultivating oil palm plot
i or also a different person. We also control for total land availability
of the household. As current land availability may potentially be
influenced by the contracts, we use land availability in 2008, when
most of the contracted farmers were just entering a contract
scheme. This historical land availability was obtained through recall
questions during the survey.
At the village level, in addition to market access, we also control
for local shocks that occurred during the five years prior to the sur-
vey, including droughts, floods or unusually heavy rainfall, or
Table 3
Number of observations by contract type and farm size.
Total Marketing contract (Western Region) Resource-providing contract (Central Region) Comparison (Ashanti Region)
Household observations
Total sample 463 193 164 106
Small-scale (<10 acres) 182 86 51 45
Medium-scale (10–20 acres) 177 76 60 41
Larger-scale (>20 acres) 104 31 53 20
Plot observations
Total sample 551 225 205 121
Small-scale (<10 acres) 191 93 53 45
Medium-scale (10–20 acres) 211 88 78 46
Larger-scale (>20 acres) 149 44 74 31
Note: Farm size refers to the land available to farmers, which may be larger than the land actually cultivated.
6 A. Ruml, M. Qaim /World Development 136 (2020) 105110heavy pest and disease infestations affecting crop and livestock
production. As such shocks are expected to influence farmers’ crop-
ping and investment decisions and could also be spatially corre-
lated with participation in the different contract schemes, not
controlling for shocks could result in omitted variable bias. Finally,
we control for the average land rent in the village, which is an indi-
cator of local land scarcity.
The models in equations (1) and (2) are estimated for the sam-
ple as a whole, with all plot and household observations, as well as
separately with observations from the subsamples for the three
farm size categories (small-, medium-, and large-scale farmers).
We use ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimators for the models
with continuous outcome variables and probit estimators for the
input use models with binary outcome variables.5 When farmers enter a new contract, they often do not know or fully understand
the complete details of the agreement. Hence, our hypothetical contract offers are not
so different from the actual offers that farmers may get in a new contract scheme. In
the plot-level models (equation (1)), we use the WTP estimate for the farmer
managing the plot. For the household-level models (equation (2)), we use the WTP
estimate for the household head.
6 We selected one instrument for each type of contract. However, both instruments
are included in the first-stage regressions for both contracts (see Tables A3-A5 in the
Online Appendix).4.3. Dealing with endogeneity
The main explanatory variables in our models, namely farmers’
participation in marketing and resource-providing contracts, may
be endogenous due to non-random self-selection into a contract
scheme. Endogeneity would lead to correlation with the error term
and biased estimates of the contract effects (Angrist & Pischke,
2008). We use various approaches to reduce issues of endogeneity
and selection bias.
First, the sampling frame, which was described in section 3, is
integral part of our identification strategy. The farmers with mar-
keting contracts, resource-providing contracts, and without any
contracts were sampled from three different regions, which helps
to reduce issues of farmers’ self-selection within each region.
Moreover, as explained above, the three regions are very similar
in terms of agroecological and socioeconomic conditions and their
attractiveness for the palm oil industry to establish contract
schemes with smallholders. Differences in terms of soil conditions,
land scarcity, market access, and specific shocks, which may occur
between and within regions, are controlled for in the model spec-
ifications (see equations (1) and (2) above). We also carry out anal-
yses with subsamples of farmers in all three regions – those closer
and further away from the borders with the other regions – in
order to test whether the main results are robust to regional
variation.
Second, to address issues of unobserved heterogeneity between
farmers with and without contracts we use a variable that mea-
sures individual willingness-to-pay (WTP) to participate in a con-
tract scheme as an additional covariate in the regression models.
WTP was estimated based on a set of hypothetical contract offers.
In the interviews, each respondent was asked: ‘‘Would you be will-
ing to enter a contract agreement with a company for the estab-
lishment of one acre of oil palm that would increase your income
but would necessitate an initial investment of Z Ghanaian Cedis
(GHS)?” Depending on the answer (yes/no), the investmentamount Z was increased or decreased. WTP is the highest amount,
for which a ‘‘yes” answer was recorded. While the hypothetical
contract offers were quite general, we still expect that the WTP
estimates are correlated with unobserved characteristics such as
the respondents’ risk behavior and entrepreneurial attitudes.5
Hence, including the WTP estimate as an additional covariate con-
trols for relevant unobserved heterogeneity. The same approach
was also used by Bellemare and Novak (2017) in a recent study of
the effects of contract farming among smallholders in Madagascar.
As a third approach to test and control for endogeneity, we use
instrumental variable (IV) estimators. As we have two potentially
endogenous variables (MC and RPC), we need at least two instru-
ments that are correlated with participation in a contract scheme
but uncorrelated with the outcome variables. We chose both
instruments according to the companies’ reported procedures to
select villages in which they offer contracts. Participation in the
marketing contract scheme is instrumented with a variable that
measures the share of commercial oil palm producers relative to
the total village population (‘village share’). Palm oil companies
are more likely to procure from villages with a high share of com-
mercial oil palm producers, in order to keep transport and transac-
tion costs low. As such, the instrument is a measure of transaction
costs. Due to the agroecological comparability across regions, a
high share of oil palm producing households within the village is
not correlated with the suitability for oil palm cultivation, and does
thus not directly influence the outcome variables.
Participation in the resource-providing contract scheme is
instrumented with a dummy variable that equals one if the village
chief cultivates oil palm commercially (‘village chief’). The village
chief typically acts as a mediator between the company and the
oil palm farmers in the village, and the contract scheme can hardly
start in the village without the chief’s approval. Hence, contracts
are more likely to be initiated in a village when the village chief
is a commercial oil palm farmer and can benefit from the scheme
himself/herself.6
In principle, the two identified instruments might also be corre-
lated with the outcome variables. For instance, the share of com-
mercial oil palm farmers in the village could be positively
associated with local soil quality or market access, which could
also influence input use, yields, and cropping portfolios. Similarly,
the village chief being a commercial oil palm grower might possi-
bly affect farmers’ access to information, which could also lead to
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direct correlation using the subsample of comparison farmers,
where no indirect effects through the contract pathway may occur.
These tests for both instruments and all outcome variables are
shown in Tables A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix. None of the
correlation coefficients is statistically significant, which is an indi-
cation of instrument exogeneity. Tables A3-A5 in the Online
Appendix show first-stage results of the plot-level and
household-level IV models. As expected, the instruments are sig-
nificantly correlated with participation in the contract schemes,
so that all criteria for instrument validity seem to be fulfilled. It
should be stressed that proving instrument validity is difficult,
especially with cross-sectional data. However, as we use different
approaches to deal with endogeneity, cautious causal inference
should be in order, especially when the different approaches sup-
port the same conclusions.5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 4 shows selected characteristics of households in the total
sample and disaggregated by farm size to provide a better under-
standing of the socioeconomic situation of oil palm farmers in
Ghana. The average household has a landholding of 18 acres, with
small-scale farmers having about 6 acres and large-scale farmers
around 40 acres. Average annual per capita expenditures are
2800 GHS, which is more than twice the national poverty line of
1314 GHS. Clearly, market-oriented oil palm farmers do not belong
to the poorest of the poor in rural Ghana. Nevertheless, around 13%
of the sample farmers live below the poverty line. The share of poor
households is much higher among small-scale farmers (16%) than
among large-scale farmers (7%).
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics of the outcome and control
variables by contract type. For the outcome variables, we find sig-
nificant differences especially between the households with
resource-providing contracts and the other two groups. Differences
between households with simple marketing contracts and without
any contracts are less sizeable and partly statistically insignificant.
For the control variables, we find significant differences between
contract types for experience in oil palm farming, market access,
average land rents, and willingness to participate in contracts.
Interestingly, farmers without contracts have a higher WTP than
contracted farmers. This is plausible, because those farmers hold-
ing a contract already benefit from reduced marketing risk. We
do not observe differences between the groups in terms of farm
size, sex, education, soil quality, and irrigation, confirming that
the farms and households with different contract status are similar
in terms of many key characteristics.5.2. Regression results
We compared all models with and without IVs to test the null
hypothesis that the contract variables are exogenous. This null
hypothesis could not be rejected in any of the models (Tables A6
and A7 in the Online Appendix), which suggests that the estimators
without IVs are consistent and that the effects of the contracts esti-
mated with these models do not suffer from selection bias. This is
plausible given that the sampling frame used helped to reduce
individual selection issues. Nevertheless, we also report the IV
results next to the probit and OLS results. The IV estimates support
the same conclusions, only that they are somewhat less efficient
than the estimates without IVs.
Table 6 summarizes the estimated effects of contracts on the
plot-level outcome variables (full model estimates are shown inTables A8 and A9 in the Online Appendix). The results suggest that
the marketing contract has no significant effects on input use and
yield. This is quite different for the resource-providing contract
where we observe positive and statistically significant effects on
fertilizer use and yield. The resource-providing contract increases
the probability of chemical fertilizer use by 18 percentage points.
It also increases oil palm yield by 2.9 t/acre, which is a gain of
75% when compared to the mean yield of non-contracted farmers.
The effect of the resource-providing contract on herbicide use is
positive but not statistically significant. These results clearly sug-
gest that the resource-providing contract contributes to more
intensified production patterns and higher land productivity. This
does not seem to be the case for the marketing contract. Thus,
reduction in risk through the secure sales market is insufficient,
and credit market failures need to be addressed directly in a
capital-intensive crop sector.
Table 7 summarizes the estimated effects of the contracts on
the household-level outcomes (full model estimates are shown in
Table A10 in the Online Appendix). The marketing contract has
no significant effect on the scale of production and on specializa-
tion in terms of the area share of oil palm. However, producing
under the marketing contract reduces the number of other cash
crops produced by 0.5 on average, suggesting that some specializa-
tion on oil palm occurs. In comparison, the resource-providing con-
tract has statistically significant effects on all three household-
level outcomes. It increases the scale of production by 4 percentage
points and the share of the commercial area planted with oil palm
by almost 10 percentage points. Producing under a resource-
providing contract also reduces the number of other cash crops
produced by 0.5 on average.
These estimation results confirm that contracts can increase
input intensity and productivity and also lead to higher invest-
ments and specialization on the contracted crop. However, as
hypothesized, the effects can vary with the type of contract and
are larger for the resource-providing contract than for the simple
marketing contract. In fact, we did not observe any effects of the
simple marketing contract on most of the outcome variables con-
sidered. It seems that reduced marketing risk alone is insufficient
to overcome problems of access to credit and input markets. In
addition to the regular inputs (fertilizer and herbicides) analyzed
here, farmers under the resource-providing contract also have
much better access to high-quality planting material for oil palms,
which is costly but important for vigorous plant growth and higher
yields throughout the plantation cycle.
5.3. Effects by farm size category
We now analyze the effects of the contracts separately for
small-, medium-, and large-scale farmers. The results of the plot-
level models are summarized in Table 8 (full model results are
shown in Tables A11 and A12 in the Online Appendix). We do
not find significant effects of the marketing contract on input use
and yield for any of the farm size categories. However, we do
observe positive and significant effects of the resource-providing
contract.
The resource-providing contract increases input use and yield,
especially among small-scale farmers. For small-scale farmers,
the probability of fertilizer and herbicide use is increased by 19
and 32 percentage points, respectively. These effects are larger
than what we observed for the full sample in Table 6, where the
effect on herbicide use was not statistically significant. The
resource-providing contract increases the oil palm yield of small-
scale farmers by about 4 t/acre, which means more than a doubling
of yields when comparing to the mean yield of non-contracted
farmers. The resource-providing contract also increases fertilizer
use and yield among the medium-scale farmers, whereas for
Table 4
Household welfare characteristics for total sample and by farm size category.
Total sample Small-scale Medium-scale Larger-scale
Land availability (in acres) 18.33 6.13 14.42 39.54
(18.96) (2.22) (2.84) (25.56)
Per capita expenditure (in GHS per year) 2800 2510 2841 3104
(2084) (1496) (2168) (2521)
Share of farmers below poverty line a 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.07
(0.33) (0.37) (0.35) (0.26)
Note: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. aThe national poverty line is 1314 GHS per year, equivalent to $1.83 per capita and day in purchasing
power parity terms (Cooke et al., 2016).
Table 5
Descriptive statistics by contract type.
Mean Difference
Marketing contract (MC) Resource-providing contract (RPC) No contract (NC) MC-RPC MC-NC RPC-NC
Outcome variables
Chemical fertilizer application (dummy) 0.07 0.20 0.03 *** ***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Herbicide application (dummy) 0.44 0.64 0.50 *** **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Yield (t/acre) 3.10 6.65 3.82 *** ***
(0.15) (0.40) (0.70)
Scale of production (0–1) 0.79 0.87 0.84 *** **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Specialization (0–1) 0.53 0.58 0.50 * ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cash crop diversity (number) 1.20 1.29 1.74 *** ***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.12)
Control variables
Cocoa cultivation (dummy) 0.12 0.13 0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Land availability (acres in 2008) 13.23 14.91 12.37
(0.93) (1.31) (1.50)
Female household head (dummy) 0.15 0.20 0.15
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Education of household head (years) 7.65 6.86 7.03
(0.32) (0.37) (0.38)
Experience of household head (years) 19.56 15.65 16.74 *** ***
(0.61) (0.74) (0.77)
Female farmer (dummy) 0.25 0.28 0.23
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Education of farmer (years) 7.52 7.10 7.16
(0.31) (0.33) (0.34)
Experience of farmer (years) 20.23 15.32 17.20 *** *** *
(0.58) (0.66) (0.73)
Willingness to pay (in 500 GHS) 2.06 2.13 2.73 *** **
(0.12) (0.15) (0.19)
Number of palms per acre 68.85 63.96 63.10
(2.99) (2.22) (1.22)
Age of palms (years) 12.89 9.33 14.87 *** *** ***
(0.45) (0.06) (0.43)
Irrigation (dummy) 0.32 0.33 0.25
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Good soil (dummy) 0.66 0.73 0.73
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Market access (km) 0.85 1.12 0.12 *** ***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.05)
Distance to input provider (km) 0.66 4.34 1.80 *** *** ***
(0.09) (0.59) (0.25)
Average land rent (GHS per acre) 152.54 18.33 95.57 *** *** ***
(11.07) (4.46) (11.75)
Shocks (number in last 5 years) 0.22 0.58 1.15 *** *** ***
(0.04) (0.13) (0.13)
Note: Mean values are shown with standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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use of fertilizer. These are interesting findings that support our
hypothesis that credit and input market imperfections outside of
contracts are more constraining for smallholders than for large-
scale producers.The results of the household-level models are summarized in
Table 9 (full model results in Table A13 in the Online Appendix).
Surprisingly, the marketing contract seems to have a negative
effect on the scale of production among small-scale farmers. At
the same time, the marketing contract seems to incentivize
Table 6
Summary of contract effects on plot-level outcomes (total sample).
Chemical fertilizer use (dummy) Herbicide use (dummy) Yield (t/acre)
Probit IV probit Probit IV probit OLS IV
Marketing contract 0.0508 0.0202 0.0117 0.1323 0.7664 0.0677
(0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.28) (0.84) (1.62)
Resource-providing contract 0.1797*** 0.1462 0.1211 0.0952 2.9182*** 2.4741
(0.05) (0.12) (0.09) (0.27) (0.87) (1.80)
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
WTP included Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 551 551 551 551 551 551
Note: Average marginal effects are shown with cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses. WTP, willingness-to-pay. Full model results are shown in Tables A8 and A9 in
the Online Appendix. ***p < 0.01.
Table 7
Summary of contract effects on household-level outcomes (total sample).
Scale of production (0-1) Specialization (0-1) Cash crop diversity (number)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Marketing contract 0.0196 0.0354 0.0123 0.0260 0.5093*** 0.6662**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.10) (0.12) (0.26)
Resource-providing contract 0.0417** 0.0057 0.0961*** 0.0157** 0.5229*** 0.7189**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.13) (0.30)
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
WTP included Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463
Note: Marginal effects are shown with cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses. WTP, willingness-to-pay. Full model results are shown in Table A10 in the Online
Appendix. **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 8
Summary of contract effects on plot-level outcomes by farm size category (subsample analyses).
Chemical fertilizer use (dummy) Herbicide use (dummy) Yield (t/acre)
Marketing contract Small-scale 0.0677 0.0716 0.2379
(0.08) (0.10) (0.69)
Medium-scale 0.0485 0.1448 0.1732
(0.09) (0.14) (0.50)
Large-scale 0.0337 0.0975 2.0271
(0.12) (0.12) (1.72)
Resource-providing contract Small-scale 0.1909*** 0.3231*** 4.0295***
(0.06) (0.12) (0.91)
Medium-scale 0.1813** 0.0454 4.3482***
(0.08) (0.13) (0.53)
Large-scale 0.1712* 0.1403 0.6007
(0.01) (0.11) (2.18)
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes
WTP included Yes Yes Yes
Note: Average marginal effects are shown with cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses. WTP, willingness-to-pay. Full model results are shown in Tables A11 and A12
in the Online Appendix. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 9
Summary of contract effects on household-level outcomes by farm size category (subsample analyses).
Scale of production (0-1) Specialization (0-1) Cash crop diversity (number)
Marketing contract Small-scale 0.0497** 0.0601 0.4599*
(0.02) (0.05) (0.25)
Medium-scale 0.0033 0.0113 0.7148***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.18)
Large-scale 0.0563 0.0846 0.0242
(0.07) (0.07) (0.24)
Resource-providing contract Small-scale 0.0156 0.1284** 0.4754**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.22)
Medium-scale 0.0426* 0.0887* 0.8036***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.18)
Large-scale 0.0730 0.0310 0.1705
(0.06) (0.07) (0.24)
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes
WTP included Yes Yes Yes
Note: Marginal effects are shown with cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses. WTP, willingness-to-pay. Full model results are shown in Table A13 in the Online
Appendix. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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cash crops produced. For large-scale farmers, the marketing con-
tract has no significant effects on the scale of production or on
oil palm specialization.
The resource-providing contract increases oil palm specializa-
tion among small- and medium-scale farmers. Among medium-
scale farmers, we also observe a positive effect on the scale of pro-
duction. The resource-providing contract has no effects on large-
scale farmers.
In summary, the disaggregated analyses show that the effects of
contracts can vary not only by contract type but also by farm size
category. Large-scale farmers are mostly unaffected by both types
of contracts. In contrast, small- and medium-scale farmers benefit
from the resource-providing contract in terms of higher invest-
ments, higher yields, and higher levels of specialization.5.4. Robustness checks with regional subsamples
One of the concerns in our impact analysis is that we compare
farmers with and without contracts in different regions, so that it is
not entirely clear whether observed differences in the outcome
variables are due to differences in contract types and/or regional
conditions. As discussed, we paid particular attention to choose
three regions that are very similar. Of course, differences in terms
unobserved conditions are possible, but based on the available data
and own field observations we argue that such differences can
occur to the same extent within and between the three regions,
so that a systematic bias is unlikely. Nevertheless, some robustness
checks with subsamples from within each region may be useful.
We choose two subsamples in each of the three regions, namely
(i) observations from villages located most closely to the other
region borders and (ii) observations from the villages located fur-
thest away from the other region borders. For these subsamples
we re-estimate the regression models and obtain results that are
similar to the ones estimated above with the full sample.
The plot-level results of the regional subsample regressions are
shown in Table 10. As before, we do not find any statistical evi-
dence that the marketing contract leads to changes in input use
or oil palm yield, whereas the resource-providing contract
increases the likelihood of using chemical inputs and also con-
tributes to substantially higher yields. For the farmers furthest
away from the other region borders, the effects of the resource-
providing contracts on chemical input use are not statistically sig-
nificant, which may be due to the smaller subsample. However, the
effect on yield for this subsample is even larger than for the full
sample, suggesting that the resource-providing contract affects
production decisions and productivity.
The household-level results for the regional subsamples are
shown in Table A14 in the Online Appendix. These results are also
similar to the full sample results, namely that the resource-
providing contract increases the scale of production and farmers’
specialization on oil palm, whereas the resource-providing con-
tract does not.7 Overall, these robustness checks support the main
conclusions and suggest that the findings are not driven by regional
differences, providing further confidence in the identification
strategy.8 When only interpreting the lack of effects of the marketing contract one could be
tempted to conclude that the failures in the spot market are possibly not so grave.
However, also considering the resource-providing contract reveals that large6. Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed and compared the effects of
marketing contracts and resource-providing contracts on agricul-
tural investments and productivity in the small farm sector of7 In the villages furthest away from the region borders, the marketing contract even
seems to decrease the level of specialization on oil palm (Table A14).Ghana. Previous studies had evaluated the effects of contracts in
different settings, but very few studies had compared the effects
of different contract types in the same setting, as we have done
here. Our results can contribute to a better understanding of what
type of contracts can be useful for smallholder farmers and for
agricultural development in what type of situations.
We have collected and used survey data of oil palm farmers in
the southern parts of Ghana. A sampling frame specifically
designed for this study has helped us to reduce issues of selection
bias in the evaluation of contract effects. Furthermore, we have
used IV models and also included WTP estimates as an additional
control variable to deal with unobserved heterogeneity between
contracted and non-contracted farmers. The results support two
main conclusions.
The first conclusion is that contracts can reduce risks and other
market failures and thus contribute to agricultural growth in the
small farm sector, but that the actual results depend on the con-
tract characteristics. Not all contracts are useful in every situation.
We have found sizeable effects of the resource-providing contract
on input use, oil palm yield, specialization, and the scale of produc-
tion. In the resource-providing contract scheme, farmers have a
secure market for their output. In addition, the contracting com-
pany offers various inputs, technologies, and technical services
on credit. In contrast, we have found no significant effects of the
simple marketing contract on input use or on any of the other out-
come variables considered. We conclude that a secure output mar-
ket alone is insufficient to increase farm investments and
productivity in a setting with severe credit and input market fail-
ures. This is especially true for high-value crops – such as oil palm
and other plantation crops – that require relatively large upfront
investments.8
A few previous studies showed that simple marketing contracts
can contribute to productivity growth in the small farm sector (e.g.,
Henningsen et al., 2015; Rao et al., 2012). These studies referred to
vegetables or other annual crops in situations where the required
upfront investment was either low or where credits and inputs
were accessible to farmers also when not offered as part of the con-
tract. Other studies that referred to different crops and different
countries did not find significant effects of simple marketing con-
tracts (e.g., Hernández et al., 2007; Mwambi et al., 2016), possibly
because the required investments for technological upgrading
were larger, or credit and input market failures more severe, as
in our case. For comparison: most studies that analyzed
resource-providing contracts found positive effects on smallholder
investments and productivity (e.g., Champika & Abeywickrama,
2014; Maertens & Velde, 2017; Ragasa et al., 2018). Our study with
both marketing and resource-providing contracts examined and
compared in the same setting and for the same crop helps to
explain some of the impact heterogeneity observed in the previous
literature.
The second main conclusion from our study is that the effects of
contracts cannot only vary with contract characteristics, but also
between different farm size categories. Resource-providing con-
tracts seem to be particularly beneficial for small- and medium-
scale farmers, whereas the effects of both types of contracts on
large-scale farmers were mostly insignificant. These pro-poor dis-
tributional effects are welcome and can be explained by the fact
that small- and medium-scale farmers often suffer most fromproductivity increases are possible when the existing credit and input market
failures are properly addressed. As discussed above, yield increases are particularly
relevant to boost palm oil production while protecting tropical biodiversity and
ecologically fragile ecosystems (Qaim et al., 2020).
Table 10
Robustness checks with subsamples (plot level).













Marketing contract 0.01 0.05 1.36 0.01 0.05 0.43
(0.10) (0.15) (1.18) (0.05) (0.10) (0.27)
Resource-providing contract 0.19*** 0.20* 2.63** 0.04 0.22 4.40***
(0.07) (0.11) (0.27) (0.04) (0.15) (1.31)
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
WTP included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 383 383 383 273 273 273
Note: The villages closest to the borders include five villages with marketing contracts, five villages without contracts, and seven villages with resource-providing contracts
that are closest to the joint regional borders. The villages furthest from the borders include five villages with marketing contracts, five villages without contracts, and seven
villages with resource-providing contracts that are furthest from the joint regional borders. Average marginal effects are shown with cluster-corrected standard errors in
parentheses. WTP, willingness-to-pay. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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and medium-scale farmers have access to contracts that help
reduce some of the market imperfections, they may benefit more
than large-scale farmers, who often have better market access
anyway.
Of course, the concrete findings are specific to the palm oil sec-
tor in Ghana and should not be generalized. In Ghana, small-scale
farmers have access to contracts with palm oil companies, because
the demand for palm oil is growing rapidly and companies cannot
source sufficient quantities when relying on the supply of large-
scale farmers alone. In many other situations, small-scale farmers
find it more difficult to enter a contract scheme, because compa-
nies often prefer to deal with larger farms in order to keep transac-
tion costs low. Especially for resource-providing contracts, side-
selling can also be an issue and is not always easy to monitor when
dealing with a large number of smallholders (Otsuka et al., 2016).
Side-selling is not yet much of an issue in Ghana’s palm oil sector,
because the contracting companies buy fresh fruit bunches,
whereas larger sales on the open market usually require own pro-
cessing by farmers. Own processing is labor-intensive and needs to
be done immediately after the harvest, because of the perishability
of the fresh oil palm fruits. However, in spite of these specific con-
ditions, the general findings that contract characteristics matter
and that resource-providing contracts are more suitable to reduce
market failures in the small farm sector than simple marketing
contracts probably also hold in other situations.
In closing, two limitations of our study shall be mentioned.
First, we used cross-section observational data to evaluate the
effects of contracts. While we used different approaches to reduce
issues of selection bias and obtained consistent results, possible
endogeneity of contract participation remains a concern that is dif-
ficult to fully address with cross-section data. Studies with panel
data or with experimental approaches in a more controlled setting
could further strengthen the identification of causal effects. Sec-
ond, the focus of our study was on the effects of contracts on farm
investments, input intensity, and productivity. While these out-
comes are important indicators of agricultural growth and devel-
opment, they do not necessarily measure farm household
welfare. Even profits or income from oil palm production would
not be good indicators of household welfare, because other eco-
nomic activities and income sources of the household may also
be affected by contracts through the reallocation of household
resources (Ruml, Ragasa, & Qaim, 2020). Analyzing the effects of
contracts on farm household livelihoods more comprehensively
would require other outcome variables, such as income from dif-
ferent farm and non-farm activities, consumption expenditures,
or indicators related to family health and nutrition. These are inter-
esting directions for follow-up research.Declarations of interest
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